Nearly 20 months after the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) held parliamentary elections in October 2024, it remains without a new cabinet, causing one of the longest government formation crises in KRI. The delay has extended far beyond the political bargaining that follows elections and has increasingly raised questions about the resilience of the KRI’s political system.
The deadlock is not merely the result of disagreements over ministerial portfolios or senior appointments but it also reflects a deeper challenge confronting domestic politics: whether the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) can redefine their relationship in a political environment that has become more competitive, economically constrained, and regionally complex.
Shift in power-sharing dynamics
For more than three decades, the relationship between the Erbil-based KDP and the Sulaymaniyah-based PUK has defined the political trajectory of the KRI. Despite periods of intense rivalry, including the civil war in the 1990s, the two parties ultimately established a system of balance based on negotiated power-sharing. While this arrangement has been criticized for encouraging the party-based governance and institutional fragmentation, it has also played a significant role in preserving stability and preventing renewed internal conflict.
The current parliamentary balance resulting from the latest elections illustrates why negotiations have become particularly complex. The KDP emerged as the largest political force with 39 seats, while the PUK secured 23 seats. The New Generation Movement (NGM) won 15 seats, confirming its position as the KRI’s largest opposition force.
This distribution has significantly influenced post-election negotiations. By reaching an alliance with the NGM, the PUK has strengthened its negotiating position. While this alignment does not itself produce a governing majority, it substantially reshapes the bargaining environment by limiting the KDP’s parliamentary leverage and increasing the PUK’s room for negotiation.
The KDP approaches government formation through party-to-party negotiations, whereas the PUK, in alliance with the NGM, advocates conducting the process as a bloc. While the Sulaymaniyah demands a half share in the new government, the KDP insists on its position as the largest party. With negotiations deadlocked, the KDP has even raised the possibility of early elections. While both parties seek to strengthen their negotiating positions, the government formation has become increasingly protracted.
However, rather than indicating the total collapse of the KDP-PUK balance, the current deadlock highlights the continuing centrality of their relationship. The challenge is no longer whether they will eventually cooperate, but whether they can redefine the terms of that cooperation in a manner better suited to today’s political realities.
A path to a new balance?
Despite the evolving parliamentary landscape, the political realities of the KRI continue to make cooperation between the KDP and the PUK indispensable. As a matter of fact, the PUK-NGM bloc cannot realistically establish a stable regional government without engaging the KDP. Likewise, the KDP cannot ignore the institutional and political weight of the PUK.
Therefore, the electoral success alone does not translate into governability in the KRI’s consensus-based political system. Thus, the current deadlock extends beyond negotiating for the cabinet formation, at its core lies a more fundamental question: can the KDP and the PUK establish a sustainable balance of power that reflects today’s political realities.
Meanwhile, although fresh elections may appear to offer a democratic solution to prolonged political deadlock, they are unlikely to resolve the structural issues between the ruling parties. Instead, new elections would impose additional financial burdens on the region already facing considerable economic pressures while potentially creating further opportunities for intervention by Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court.
Even if the KDP and the PUK eventually succeed in forming a new cabinet, unresolved disagreements over authority, institutional control, security coordination, and resource management may continue to undermine governance, as witnessed during previous administrations. If they fail to achieve such a balance, divisions are likely to persist even after a government is formed, limiting the KRI’s capacity to address economic challenges, weakening its negotiating position vis-à-vis Baghdad and creating further opportunities for external actors to exploit internal disagreements.
Conversely, if the current negotiations produce not merely another coalition agreement but a more sustainable political understanding, they could mark an important turning point in the KRI’s political development. Achieving that objective would strengthen the KRI’s institutions, enhance its resilience within Iraq’s federal system, and provide a more stable foundation for addressing the political, economic and security challenges that lie ahead.
In fact, the Kurdish society itself has evolved. Younger generation’s expectations differ significantly from those of previous generations. Many younger voters evaluate political parties more according to their ability to deliver public services, economic opportunity, institutional accountability and transparent governance. This gradual shift is changing political incentives for both ruling parties. This situation should motivate the KDP and PUK to institutionalize the region within a new balance of power. Therefore, whether the two governing parties can redefine their political relationship in a manner capable of preventing future crises is key to KRI’s current problems.
Last but not least, the conflicts in the Middle East also alarmingly necessitate a new understanding between the KDP and PUK, beyond a temporary government formation. The KDP and PUK can simultaneously maintain positive relations with warring parties Iran and the US, and keep the KRI out of the war. Therefore, they should direct this diplomatic capacity and vision towards improving communication between themselves and enabling the KRI to establish a new cabinet and a new balance of power.