Türkiye’s resumption of high-level contacts with the Sulaymaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) after nearly a decade opens the door to a new era in bilateral relations, the politics of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and regional competition at a critical juncture.
This important opening in Ankara’s KRI policy reflects both the positive impact of the “Terror-Free Türkiye” process on Türkiye’s relations with Kurdish groups in the region and the effects of the war between the US/Israel and Iran, which has prompted Iran-aligned actors in Iraq to seek a new balance in their foreign policy.
Establishing good relations simultaneously with the two parties that have dominated the KRI for over 30 years, the Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the PUK, can offer Türkiye significant advantages. These include extending its influence across Kurdish geopolitics throughout the KRI, expanding commercial partnerships and investments, particularly in energy, ensuring the security of its southern borders, and competing with Iran for regional influence.
Why Did the KDP-Centric Perspective Transform?
The struggle against the PKK, which has been the primary determinant of Ankara’s KRI policy, has also directly influenced the course and limits of bilateral relations for many years, depending on the stance of Kurdish parties in the region toward this issue. While Ankara achieved a clear alignment with the Barzani family-led party through both its military bases and operations in the KDP-controlled regions of Duhok and Erbil, it experienced various crises in its relations with the Talabani family-led PUK in Sulaymaniyah on the grounds that the PKK operated freely there.
As part of the “Terror-Free Türkiye” process, the PKK’s decision to disband and lay down its arms had a significant positive impact not only on Ankara’s domestic affairs but also on the course of its relations with Kurdish actors in Iraq. In addition to the contributions of the KDP, one of the key mediators in the process, it was noteworthy that the PUK also hosted a group from the PKK in Sulaymaniyah last July to lay down their arms. In response, Ankara’s decision in October 2025 to lift the flight ban it had imposed on Sulaymaniyah, citing the organization’s presence in the city, was interpreted as an indication that the issue that had caused a crisis between the two actors had lost its significance or been resolved.
Another development that softened relations along the Ankara-Sulaymaniyah line was the repercussions of the US/Israel-Iran war that began in February. Although US objectives regarding the overthrow of the regime in Iran were not fully realized during the war, Türkiye’s position as a non-belligerent party, its role as a peace mediator, and its increasing regional influence pushed Iran-aligned Iraqi actors toward a new rebalancing. Certain Iran-aligned Iraqi Shia groups that once opposed Turkish bases in Iraq have recently increased their contacts with Ankara. Similarly, the PUK’s warm messages toward Türkiye, its support for the “Terror-Free Türkiye” process, and its efforts to repair relations reflected this broader trend. Another important factor facilitating this rapprochement was the PUK’s support for the election of Iraqi Turkmen Front Chairman Muhammed Seman Ağa, who is close to Ankara, as the rotating governor of Kirkuk.
Normalization Along the Ankara-Sulaymaniyah Line and the Rift Between the KDP and PUK
Turkish Ambassador to Baghdad Anıl Bora İnan’s meeting with PUK-affiliated KRI Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani and PUK President Bafel Talabani in Erbil on June 4 marked a significant moment in normalization along the Ankara-PUK axis. The meeting represented a historic milestone in overcoming Ankara’s negative perception of PUK leader Talabani, who officially posed for photographs with a Turkish diplomat for the first time in many years.
Subsequently, National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Chief İbrahim Kalın’s meeting with Bafel Talabani and Qubad Talabani in Sulaymaniyah on July 1, followed by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s meeting with Qubad Talabani in Ankara on July 3, signaled the beginning of a period in which the pattern of mutual visits between Ankara and Erbil would extend to Ankara and Sulaymaniyah. These developments indicated that the phase of repairing Türkiye-PUK relations had been completed and a period of mutual rapprochement had begun.
However, as Türkiye has diversified the KDP-centric approach that shaped its KRI policy for nearly a decade, disagreements within the government formation negotiations between the KDP and the PUK, which have lasted nearly 22 months, have intensified, bringing discussions of a dual administration back to the agenda.
At a time when the “Terror-Free Türkiye” process has even helped thaw relations between the KDP and the SDF, the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, leading to Mazlum Abdi being hosted in Erbil multiple times, the escalation of the KDP-PUK dispute reflects the structural and chronic power struggle between the two major Kurdish parties.
In this context, the PUK’s alliance with the Sulaymaniyah-based New Generation Movement, which brought their combined parliamentary seat count to 38 against the KDP’s 39, strengthened its ability to oppose a KDP-dominated government and demand a 50-50 governance model in the KRI, reminiscent of the era of the party’s founding leader, Jalal Talabani. The deepening division between the KDP and the PUK and the prolonged failure to form a new government represent both a democratic shortcoming and an obstacle to Türkiye’s holistic KRI policy.
Bridging the Ankara-Erbil-Sulaymaniyah Axis
The PUK’s contentious relations with Türkiye, a prominent NATO member, a gateway to the West, and a major hub for energy exports, had contributed to Sulaymaniyah’s political and economic isolation in the region. This state of affairs had also long prevented Türkiye from pursuing a more comprehensive KRI policy that could enhance Ankara’s regional influence.
At this juncture, normalization in Ankara-Sulaymaniyah relations opens the door to a new era not only for these two actors but also for Erbil. While the KDP views its close relations with Türkiye as an asset in its domestic political competition with the PKK and the PUK, these ties have also strengthened economic relations and contributed to the close alignment of Turkmens in the KRI with the KDP.
Close ties between Turkish leaders and KDP officials, most notably KRI President Nechirvan Barzani, have also facilitated the development of joint positions on regional politics between Ankara and Erbil. Although the rapid steps taken to repair and develop PUK-Ankara relations challenge the KDP’s monopoly on relations with Türkiye, they are not expected to negatively affect the longstanding Ankara-Erbil relationship.
Ankara’s development of holistic and comprehensive policies toward the KRI, engaging with all actors, will positively affect the KRI’s internal stability and security and support reconciliation, balance, and harmony between the KDP and the PUK. In this context, Ankara’s ability to establish good relations with both deeply rooted Kurdish parties should strengthen the scope of Turkish foreign policy toward the KRI, contribute to resolving the government formation crisis, and reduce the incentives behind calls for a dual administration.
Türkiye’s successful mediation initiatives on Russia-Ukraine, US-Iran, and Palestine-related issues offer examples of its capacity to undertake similar initiatives for its immediate neighbor, the KRI. The failure of the KDP and the PUK to achieve a rapprochement that would resolve the government formation crisis, even after the Twelve Day War and the war that began in February, illustrates the potential difficulty of this process. Nevertheless, just as Iraqi Kurdish actors contributed to the “Terror-Free Türkiye” process, Türkiye can play a greater role as a reliable regional power for Iraqi Kurds in promoting harmony, stability, and prosperity within the KRI.
In line with the spirit of this new era in Türkiye-KRI relations along the Ankara-Erbil-Sulaymaniyah axis, constructive steps by all parties must encompass not only diplomatic talks but also commercial investments, economic initiatives involving the export of Sulaymaniyah’s abundant natural resources, and greater interaction between societies.
Harmony between the KRI’s two deeply rooted parties and greater regional stability and security will benefit both the KDP and the PUK, as well as the population of the KRI. These developments will also benefit Türkiye by expanding energy and commercial partnerships, strengthening mutual trust, enhancing the security of its southern borders, and improving coordination of the PKK’s disarmament, a crucial phase of the “Terror-Free Türkiye” process.
Ankara’s policy of seeking regional solutions to Middle Eastern conflicts without external intervention, as reflected in its approach to the US/Israel-Iran war, can contribute both to resolving disputes between the KDP and the PUK and to addressing contentious issues between the KRI and Iraq more constructively. Given Türkiye’s strong position in the KRI and its growing economic, political, and diplomatic influence across Iraq, this approach will also strengthen its position in the regional competition with Iran.